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Abstract—Although in-band full-duplex (IBFD) radios promise to double
the throughput of a wireless link, they are more vulnerable to jamming
attacks than their out-of-band full-duplex (OBFD) counterparts. For two
communicating OBFD nodes, a jammer needs to attack both the uplink
and the downlink channels to completely break the communication link.
In contrast, only one common channel needs to be jammed in the case
of two IBFD nodes. Even worse, a jammer with self-interference sup-
pression (SIS) capabilities (the underlying technique of IBFD radios) can
learn the transmitters’ activity while injecting interference, allowing it to
react instantly to the transmitter’s strategies. In this work, we consider a
power-constrained IBFD “reactive-sweep” jammer that sweeps through
the set of channels by jamming a subset of them simultaneously. We
model the interactions between the IBFD radios and the jammer as a
stochastic constrained zero-sum Markov game in which nodes adopt
the frequency hopping (FH) technique as their strategies to counter jam-
ming attacks. Beside the IBFD transmission-reception (TR) mode, we
introduce an additional operation mode, called transmission-detection
(TD), in which an IBFD radio transmits and leverages its SIS capability
to detect jammers. The aim of the TD mode is to make IBFD radios more
cognitive to jamming. The nodes’ optimal defense strategy that guides
them when to hop and which operational mode (TD or TR) to use is
then established from the equilibrium of the stochastic Markov game.
We prove that this optimal policy has a threshold structure, in which
IBFD nodes stay on the same channel up to a certain number of time
slots before hopping. Simulation results show that our policy significantly
improves the throughput of IBFD nodes under jamming attacks.
Index Terms—Jamming attack, dynamic frequency hopping, in-band
full-duplex radio, Markov games.
1 INTRODUCTION
Self-interference suppression (SIS) techniques (e.g., [2], [3])
allow a transmitting device to suppress its self-interference
up to the noise floor, thus enabling wireless radios to si-
multaneously transmit and receive on the same frequency
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channel. This in-band full-duplex (IBFD) capability not only
boosts the link throughput but it also helps solve various
channel-access issues (e.g., Tx deafness, hidden/exposed
nodes) [4]. More applications of IFDB to cognitive radio
communications can be found in [5] and references therein.
A network of IBFD radios has the potential to double the
network throughput, compared with half-duplex (HD) ra-
dios that have to alternate in time/frequency/code between
transmit and receive modes. However, such a network is
also more vulnerable to jamming attacks. In this work,
we identify some of these jamming threats and investigate
anti-jamming techniques that make IBFD radios more cog-
nitive to these threats. Our techniques optimally leverage
the simultaneous transmit-and-receive capability of IBFD
devices.
A jammer can hinder legitimate transmissions in one
of two ways: (i) the jammer can inject interfering power
into the wireless medium, thus degrading the signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at a legitimate receiver,
and (ii) in carrier-sensing systems, a persistent jammer can
prevent a legitimate transmitter from accessing the medium,
effectively creating a denial-of-service (DoS) attack. These
stealthy attacks can be easily launched by an adversary
using commercial off-the-shelf (CoTS) products [6]–[8]. In
this work, we focus on the former type of jamming.
The implications of jamming on IBFD radios can be par-
ticulary acute. First, compared with out-of-band full-duplex
(OBFD) systems, which include HD devices as a special
case, a jammer can simultaneously interfere with both the
uplink and downlink, as both communicating IBFD share
the same frequency channel in the same vicinity, and hence
are likely to suffer the same jamming effect. Second, unlike
OBFD radios, operating as IBFD devices hinders nodes from
detecting a jamming attack, especially under fading. Specif-
ically, under fading, a transmission failure is not always
caused by jammers when the jamming interference (if any)
is distorted by self-interference due to imperfect SIS. Third,
a jammer with IBFD capability can discern the outcome of
its jamming instantaneously, while continuously attacking
legitimate transmissions.
Several physical-layer techniques have been developed
to mitigate the jamming of OBFD devices. These include
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spread spectrum, including frequency hopping (FH), direc-
tional antennas, and adaptive
power/coding/modulation. Jammer-specific techniques
have also been developed [6]. Common jamming models
in the literature include random, persistent, proactive, and
reactive [7], [9]. This classification is based on the jammer’s
capabilities. Persistent jammers always emit power into the
medium. Proactive jammer can vary the power to meet
various constraints. A reactive jammer exhibits a more so-
phisticated behavior, and emits power only when it detects
a legitimate transmission [8]. In this paper, we consider a
power-constrained jammer with IBFD capability, referred to
as “IBFD reactive-sweep” jammer. Specifically, this jammer
sweeps through blocks of m channels in each slot. While
jamming, the jammer can simultaneously learn the outcome
of the attack and accordingly adapt its strategy (thanks to
its SIS capability). Our jamming model explained in detail
in Section 3.
We consider a FH-based transmission link for which the
hopping sequence can be adapted on the fly. If a transmis-
sion fails, the legitimate nodes should not always hop to a
new channel. This is because radio channels are inherently
subject to fading that may also be the cause of the failure.
There is a chance nodes may hop to a channel that is
also experiencing fading. Moreover, too frequent hopping
reduces the effective throughput due to the time overhead
required for oscillators to settle down after changing the
frequency [10] (e.g., Anthros chipset has settling time of
about 7.6 ms). Of course, if a node can reliably detect the
presence of a jammer on a given channel, it should hop to
evade this jammer.
Accordingly, to effectively counter a jammer, nodes must
detect its presence. As noted in [6], it is not possible to
reliably identify the presence of a jammer through mea-
surements only. Hence it is necessary to execute consistency
checks to ascertain such presence. To that end, beside the
classical IBFD Transmission Reception (TR) mode, we intro-
duce the Transmission Detection (TD) in which an IBFD node
transmits data and simultaneously leverages its SIS capabil-
ity to detect jamming (instead of receiving data as in the TR
mode). The aim of the TD mode is to make IBFD radios more
cognitive to jamming. The jamming mitigation technique
that we develop uses the packet delivery ratio1(PDR) as an
indicator of a potential jamming activity, while leveraging
the TD mode to reliably confirm that.
In the TD mode, one node acts as a receiver while the
other node transmits and receives (listens) simultaneously.
If the PDR is low, one of the nodes can switch to TD mode.
This node can then assess the link quality by measuring
the Received Signal Strength (RSS). If the RSS is high and
the PDR is low, it would be an indication of the presence
of a jammer. On the other hand, if both the PDR and the
RSS are low, then the deterioration link quality is related to
fading. Note that the above cognition to jamming of IBFD
radios comes at the cost of lower throughput in the TD
mode, compared to the TR mode. PDR measurements are
conducted over a frame duration. RSS measurements need
to be done only when the PDR goes below a certain thresh-
1. PDR is the ratio of the number of successfully decoded packets to
the number of received packets.
old for a short time period. The duration of the sampling
window for RSS measurements should be carefully tuned
based on the traffic rate, the measuring accuracy, and the
desired detection confidence level. For details about how to
choose these values, we refer to [6].
The interactions between IBFD nodes and the jammer
are modeled as a a constrained zero-sum Markov game
[11]. The nodes’ optimal defense strategy that guides them
when to hop (equivalently, how long to remain on the same
frequency channel) and which operational mode (TD or TR)
to use is established from the equilibrium of the Markov
game such that the aggregate throughput is maximized. The
major contributions of the paper are as follows:
• We identify the severe susceptibility of IBFD radios
to attacks by IBFD-capable jammers.
• We formulate the interactions between IBFD radios
and power-constrained “IBFD reactive-sweep” jam-
mers as a stochastic zero-sum Markov game.
• We make IBFD radios more cognitive to jamming
by defining two operational modes for IBFD nodes
that help them improve jamming detection. We de-
rive the optimal counter-jamming strategy for IBFD
nodes using either the total discounted reward or the
average reward criteria.
• We compare the performance of the jointly opti-
mal FH and cognitive mode-switching strategy with
the optimal strategy based on FH only (i.e., with-
out switching between the two operating modes).
Through numerical simulations we show that by
jointly optimizing FH and TR/TD mode switching,
IBFD nodes are much more resistant to jamming than
using adaptive FH only.
Related work: As mentioned before, the SIS capability of
IBFD radios has been leveraged to solve various problems
in wireless networking and cognitive communications. In
[12], the authors developed a “Listen and Talk” protocol that
allows radios to simultaneously access and sense the spec-
trum/medium. The adaptation of IBFD radios to cognitive
communications was investigated in [13] [14]. In [15], the
authors provided solutions to secure full-duplex spectrum-
sharing wiretap networks using different antenna reception
schemes. The authors of [16] used game theory to formulate
the interactions between IBFD devices and eavesdroppers.
In [17], channel training was leveraged to enhance IBFD
physical-layer security under a wiretap channel.
Jamming and anti-jamming techniques have been well-
studied in wireless networks for HD and OBFD devices (see
[18] [19] [20] [21] [22] and therein references). Below, we only
discuss the papers that are most related to our work in terms
of attack model and defense strategies. In [23] the authors
developed an FH strategy against a “sweep jammer” in
802.11 networks. Their hopping strategy optimizes the chan-
nel residence time. A similar hopping strategy was devel-
oped in [24] using Markov Decision Process for a cognitive
radio network. The authors in [25] developed a defense
strategy that combines FH and rate adaption techniques.
Another direction is to leverage the latest advances in deep
learning and artificial intelligence to combat jammers, e.g.,
[26]
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Recently, several authors proposed protocols that lever-
age IBFD capabilities to improve the performance of ad
hoc and cellular networks [27], [28], [29]. However, the
vulnerability of IBFD nodes to jamming attacks was not
taken into account. In [30], [31], IBFD nodes were treated as
jammer-cum-receiver devices, whereby eavesdroppers are
prevented from listening to the communication through
friendly jamming. The issue of “non-friendly” jamming at-
tacks on the IBFD nodes was not considered.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to
study jamming attacks on IBFD devices and to develop jam-
ming mitigation techniques that exploit the SIS capability of
these devices to counter jammers.
Paper organization: In Section 2 we describe the problem
setup. In Section 3 we study the attack and defense strate-
gies of the jammer and the IBFD nodes, respectively. The
optimal defense strategies of the transmitter are derived
in Section 4 using MDPs. Performance evaluation through
simulations is given in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6 we
discuss future work and give concluding remarks.
2 MODEL AND SETUP
We consider two IBFD nodes A and B that communicate in
the presence of jammers. The two nodes have IBFD radios
that can operate on any one of K non-overlapping chan-
nels F = {f1, . . . , fK}. Each channel experiences additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN), which is independently and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) across all channels.
2.1 Link and Channel Models
We assume time-slotted transmissions. In each time slot,
several packets can be transmitted. During a time slot, the
states of the transmitter and the jammer remain unchanged.
Nodes transmit at a fixed power in each time slot, and
the jammer injects additive interference into the channels
to degrade the received signal.
The two-state Gilbert-Elliot channel model is used to
characterize the fading process. At a given time, each chan-
nel can either be in a fading state with probability 1-p. We
assume that when the channel is not fading, a transmission
always succeeds in the absence of a jamming attack. In
contrast, if the channel is in a fading state, the transmission
always fails irrespective of jamming. We further assume
that the fading process is independently and identically
distributed (i.i.d) across time and all channels.
Under the IBFD capability, when both uplink and down-
link are active, the net throughput achieved in the absence
of jamming is (ξ1 + ξ2)R, where R denotes the throughput
obtained when only the uplink or downlink is active and
ξi ∈ [0, 1] denotes the fraction of throughput lost due to
imperfect SIS at node i. ξi is referred to as the SIS factor.
The value of ξi depends on the hardware capabilities of
the nodes to suppress its own self interference. Recent
developments indicate that this value is ξi > 0.5, ensuring
higher rates than that is achievable for a HD link [2].
Modes of Operation: In the TR mode, a node transmits and
receives simultaneously on a link. In the TD mode, one of
the nodes only receives data packets from the other. With
some abuse of terminology, we say that a pair of nodes
operate in this TD mode when one of them operates in the
TD mode while the other operates in the TR mode. When
one node operates in the TD mode, the other node only
receives the ambient noise and can measure its strength. If
both nodes are under a jamming attack, then any of them
can operate in the TD mode and the other node can measure
the strength of the ambient noise over the same channel.
If the jammer can attack only one of the nodes and not
the other2, then the node that is in close proximity to the
jammer suffers low PDR. Hence this node can measure the
ambient noise power if the other node operates in the TD
mode. In the rest of the paper, we assume that the node
that enters into the TD is agreed upon a priori, and we
focus on the scenario where the jammer can attack both
nodes simultaneously. Our jamming detection strategy can
be easily tailored to other scenarios. For example, if the
jammer attacks only one node and the not the other, then
only one node will experience high PDR . In this case the
node which doesn’t experience high PDR can switch to the
PD node to facilitate attack detection by the other node.
Since the defence strategy we discuss later depends only
on whether or not a jammer is detected and not on how it
is detected, this defence strategy remains optimal for this
scenario.
Switching and Transmission Cost: When a node wishes to
hop between channel, it must first reconfigure its RF compo-
nents before it can start the transmissions. The duration of
this settling time depends on the device (e.g., for the Atheros
chipset card, this time is about 7.6 ms [23]), and presents
throughput loss. Additional loss occurs due to the lack of
synchronization between the Tx and Rx’s hopping time.
Collectively, we denote the average loss in throughput due
to hopping by C , and refer to it as switching cost. Outage
periods can also occur when the nodes are jammed. To
re-establish communications following a jamming attack,
several control packets must be exchanged, which do not
contribute to throughput. We denote the average loss in
throughput due to jamming by L, and refer to it as trans-
mission cost. We account for C and L in deriving the optimal
defense policy of the Tx.
2.2 Jamming Model
We consider multiple IBFD-capable jammers. Each jammer
attacks one of the channel in the set of available channels F
in each time slot and simultaneously observes the activity
of legitimate nodes (if any) on that channel, allowing it to
learn the outcome of its attack. Jammers can co-ordinate
among themselves by attacking nonoverlapping channels
to increase their chances of success. Further, when a jammer
detects activity on a channel, it and other jammers can
all simultaneously attack the same channel causing the
maximum possible degradation of the link quality. This
multi-jammer attack is equivalent to a single jammer that
attacks m channels sequentially in a time slot. Henceforth,
we can consider a single jammer that sequentially attacks
m channels, m < K , in each slot. Furthermore, the jammer
should attack each channel for a sufficiently long time to be
2. This scenario arises when a jammer is in the proximity of one node
but is ’hidden’ from the other.
4
effective; otherwise attacked nodes can easily recover lost
packets from brief outages. We assume that the jamming
power is sufficiently high to ensure PDR is low and zero
throughput for the attacked link (on the same channel).
In this paper, we consider an IBFD reactive jammer. At
the beginning of a time slot, the jammer continuously emits
white Gaussian noise into the channel. At the same time,
it uses its IBFD capability to listen for nodes’ activity on
the channel3. If the jammer detects transmission activity, it
continuously attacks that channel until no such activities is
detected. If the jammer does not detect node activity for a
while, it moves to attack other channels.
We assume a power-limited jamming model (as in [32])
with a finite number of radios. The have capacity is similar
to that of other nodes in the network. Specifically, in each
time slot, the jammer attacks m channels at a maximum
power of P . The jammer has a constraint Pavg on its time-
averaged power, where Pavg ≤ P . Due to this power
constraint, the jammer may not be able to emit power in
all time slots. Instead, for each time slot, the jammer can
choose to jam or not to jam power, i.e., PJ = {0, P} 4. Let
ωP and ω0 denote the probability of jamming with power P
and 0 (i.e., not jamming) in a time slot, respectively5. Similar
to [32], under an average-power constraint, the jammer’s
strategy space is the distribution (ω0, ωP ) on the set of
available powers that satisfies the average-power constraint.








= (ω0, ωP )|ω0 + ωP = 1 and ωPTJ ≤ Pavg
}
. (1)
We enforce the average-power constraint only on the jam-
mer and not on the nodes, as the jammer aims to minimize
the risk for being detected, which is not the case for the
legitimate nodes [32].
Fig. 1: System model.
3. The jammer could first listen for channel activity and jam it only
if some activity is detected. This conserves the jamming power but
reduces its effectiveness.
4. To be power efficient, P should be the minimum
power/interference level that the jammer believes can disrupt
the link transmission. If P = Pavg , jammer can attack in every round.
5. The jammer can use more than two power levels. In this case, the
jammer can better control his power. Our analysis can be extended for
this case provided nodes are aware of which power levels the jammer
can use.
3 JAMMING GAME: ATTACK AND DEFENSE
STRATEGIES
In this section, we discuss the attack and defense techniques
for the jammer and legitimate nodes respectively. As
discussed in [24], the attack and defense strategies follow
an arms race between the jammer and nodes. The best attack
(defense) strategy of the jammer (nodes) depends on the
strategy adopted by its opponent. Below we discuss a few
rounds of this arms race.
3.1 Attack Strategy
Assuming that the jammer is aware that nodes can hop
between channels to evade jamming, one naive attack strat-
egy is to randomly jam m out of the K channels, chosen
with equal probabilities in each time slot. In this case, as
argued in [24], the nodes should stay on the same channel
as they are equally vulnerable on all channels. In this case,
the probability of getting jammed is m/K in each time slot,
whether nodes hop or not. Anticipating nodes’ response, the
jammer may now go through all K channels sequentially,
jamming m of them in each slot and sweeping through
the next m channels, and so on. If the jammer follows a
deterministic sweep pattern, nodes can learn and effectively
counter the jamming attack by avoiding attacked channels
in a given slot. Aware of this response from nodes, the
jammer could further randomize its sweep pattern after
completing a sweep cycle.
Sweep Jammer: In the next round of arms race, legiti-
mate nodes update their strategy as follows. Once they are
jammed in a given sweep cycle, they can simply turn off
their transmitters. Not finding any activity on the channel,
the jammer would leave the channel and continue the
current sweep cycle. Nodes can then resume transmission
on the same channel because they will not be jammed again
till the end of current sweep cycle. Since a node can be
jammed at most once in each sweep cycle, the average
throughput achieved by nodes operating in the TR mode
is 2(K −m)ξR/K. If the transmitters were to use FH, they
can improve the throughput utmost by 2ξmR/K but may
also suffer throughput loss due to channel switching. When
the gain is small compared to the switching loss, nodes may
prefer to stay on the same channel and tolerate the small
loss in throughput due to a jamming attack.
IBFD Reactive Sweep Jammer: Aware of nodes’ re-
sponse to the fixed sweep pattern in each round, the jammer
then can revise its strategy so as to use a randomly ordered
sweep pattern at the state of a new sweep cycle. The node’s
strategy would be not to use the same channel but to
switch channels in anticipating the jamming attack on the
current channel (nodes may evade jamming if they leave
their channel when the jammer is about to attack and hop
on to a channel that has already been swept by the jammer
in that cycle). With the IBFD capability, the jammer can
discern nodes’ activity, if any, on channels being jammed.
Hence, if the jammer and the nodes are on the same channel,
the jammer can continuously jam it until the nodes hop
to a different channel. We refer to a jammer that applies
this strategy, derived in last round of arms race, as IBFD
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Fig. 2: IBFD Reactive Sweep Jammer: In each time slot, the
jammer attacks one selected channel and observes channel
activity. If some activity is observed, it stays on the channel
and continuously attacks it (ENGAGE state). Otherwise, it
RESTARTs a new sweep pattern if this is the end of the
current cycle, else it attacks the next channel in the sweep
cycle (CONTINUE state).
is considered in the rest of the paper. The operation of the
jammer in each time slot is depicted in Figure 2.
3.2 Defense Strategy
If nodes observe a low PDR, hopping to a different channel
would not a good strategy, because the new channel could
be in fading, and also switching channels would result in
throughput loss. However, if nodes can verify the presence
of a jammer, they must hop to a different channel, other-
wise, they will be continuously jammed (due to the IBFD
capability of the jammer). Thus, when the PDR is low, nodes
can switch to the TD mode (if not already in this mode) to
ascertain the cause of failure before taking action.
Note that while transmission fails in TR mode due to
jamming attack, the nodes will be jammed again if they
switch to TD mode in the next time slot. However, if the
nodes are already in the TD mode when they are jammed,
then they know the cause of the transmission failure, and
hence leave the channel. Also when the nodes are jammed
while operating in the TR mode, they have to re-establish
both the links and suffer throughput loss of 2L. This is
contrast to operating in the TD mode, where the throughput
loss due to jamming is L as the nodes need to re-establish
only one link. Thus, operating in TR mode gives higher
throughput of 2ξR, but jamming cannot be detected in this
mode and transmission loss is high. We define the reward
for each node and in a given round n as
R(n) ={
2ξR · 1[Success]− 2L · 1[Jammed]− 2C · 1[Hop] in TR mode
R · 1[Success]− L · 1[Jammed]− C · 1[Hop] in TD mode,(2)
The indicator 1[Event] is 1 when ‘Event’ occurs otherwise,
it is zero. Note that the reward is negative when nodes are
being jammed or when they hop. This accounts for through-
put loss in the next slot where nodes have to resynchronize
and cannot transmit immediately after hopping or incurring
jamming. We consider the worst case scenario, where any
successful jamming attack is assumed to cause throughput
loss to both the nodes.
Performance metric: If nodes have full knowledge of the
jammer’s sweep pattern, they can evade the jammer at
the minimal switching cost: In each sweep cycle, nodes
hop when the jammer is about to sweep their channel and
operate on a new channel for the rest of the time in the TR
mode. If the nodes hop to a channel that was previously
swept by the jammer in each sweep cycle, then the nodes
were never jammed. By repeating this process, nodes can
achieve the highest average throughput per round, which
can be computed as
Rm = p(2ξR)− (1− p)(2L)− 2mC/K, (3)
where p is the probability that a channel is not in fading, as
defined in Section 2.
In the absence of such knowledge, nodes should use a
policy that achieves average throughput (per round) that is
as close as possible to (3). Let Rπ(n) denote the throughput
in round n based on policy π. We define the regret of policy
π over period T as follows






The goal of the nodes is to use a policy that minimizes the
regret. Given that the nodes can learn the strategy of the
smart sweep jammer (but not the sweep pattern itself), the
nodes can estimate the likelihood of jamming attack in the
current slot and pro-actively decide to leave the channel.
Then, in each time slot, the nodes have to decide whether
to stay on or leave the current channel and also the mode of
operation. We refer to the number of time slots the nodes
operate on a channel before they leave it without being
jammed as channel residence time. The channel residence time
indicates frequency of node hops, and thus influences the
throughout loss due to channel switching.
Intuitively, the best policy for the nodes is to operate
in the TR mode on a channel and switch to the TD mode
after certain time slots to detect presence of any jamming
activity. The nodes leave the current channel, either after
detecting the jammer, or when the jammer is likely to arrive
on the current channel. Note that current decision of the
nodes influences their throughput in the subsequent slots.
In the next section, we formalize this intuition by defining
appropriate state and action space and derive the optimal
strategy using Markov decision process under both total
discounted and average reward criteria.
4 ZERO-SUM MARKOV GAME
We begin by defining the state space, action space and
derive the transition probabilities of the Markov game that
models the interaction between the jammer and the nodes.
First, note that while nodes operate on a channel, say f ,
they do not know which channels the jammer is currently
sweeping. If the nodes succeed on f ∈ F for k slots, they can
only infer that the jammer hasn’t swept through f over the
last k slots. We use these observations in defining the state
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Fig. 3: IBFD reactive sweep jammer.
space and derivation of the transition probabilities below.
For ease of notation, write K̃ = dKme.
States of the Markov chain: The state denotes outcome of
the nodes’ transmission at the end of a time slot. Let X
denote set of states given by
X = {J, y1, y2, · · · , yK̃−1, u1, u2, · · ·uK̃−1}.
The state space contains two classes of states: detected
jamming and undetected jamming. The former contains
only state J , denoting the transmission failure due to
the jamming attack (i.e., without ambiguity, jamming
is detected)6. Since the nodes can resolve the cause of
transmission failure in the TD mode, the transmitter
takes state J while operating in the TD mode only.
The second class of states (jamming not detected) has
two subclasses, namely Y := {y1, y2, · · · , yK̃−1} and
U := {u1, u2, · · · , uK̃−1}. State yk ∈ Y denotes that the
nodes has been staying on a channel continuously for
k time slots (since they last hopped onto that channel
including failed transmissions and the current slot) and
has not detected presence of jammer unambiguously and
the current transmission succeeds. State uk ∈ U denotes
that the nodes has been staying on a channel continuously
for k time slots (since they last hopped onto that channel
including failed transmissions and the current slot) and
has not detected presence of jammer unambiguously and
the current transmission fails. The subclasses Y and U
both have K̃ − 1 states as m channels are jammed in each
time slot and the nodes can then stay on the same channel
without being unjammed for at most K̃ − 1 slots. A state uk
distinguishes from a state yk by checking the transmission’s
failure (uk) or success (yk) in the current slot. Note that the
current state of the Markov chain is observable only to the
nodes. We use x ∈ X to denote a generic state.
Nodes’ Actions: The set of actions available to the nodes is
denoted as A and is given by
A = {(s,TD), (h,TD), (s,TR), (h,TR)}.
We assume that the nodes take action at the end of each time
slot after observing its current state, resulted from the effect
of its previous action. Action s1 := (s,TD) denotes that the
nodes stay on the same channel it used in the previous slot
and operate in the TD mode. Action h1 := (h,TD) denotes
that the nodes hop to a new randomly selected channel and
operate in the TD mode. Similarly, s2 := (s,TR) denotes
6. Note that fading and jamming can simultaneously disrupt a trans-
mission, in such a case, we still call it the state J .
that the nodes stay on the same channel and operate in
the TR mode and h2 := (h,TR) denotes that they hop to
a randomly selected channel and operate in the TR mode.
Note that after observing a failure in the TR mode (i.e., uk
states), the nodes should either hop (using h1 or h2) or stay
in the TD mode to detect the nature of failure but not stay
in the TR mode (i.e., action s2 should not be used in uk).
This allows the nodes to come out of uk states sooner in
case the channel is under jamming. We use a ∈ A to denote
a generic action.
Nodes’ Reward: Let U(x, a1, a2, x′) denote the reward to
the transmitter while moving from state x ∈ X to state
x′ ∈ X after it takes action a1 ∈ A and the jammer takes
action a2 ∈ PJ . Using (2) we define rewards of the nodes in
different states as follows: for all a2 ∈ PJ
U(·, a1, a2, x′) =
R, if x′ = yk, a1 = s1, k = 1, 2, · · · , K̃ − 1
−L, if x′ ∈ {J, uk}, a1 = s1, k = 1, 2, · · · , K̃ − 1
2ξR, if x′ = yk; a1 = s2; k = 1, 2, · · · , K̃ − 1
−2L, if x′ = uk; a1 = s2; k = 1, 2, · · · , K̃ − 1
R− C, if x′ = y1, a1 = h1
−L− C, if x′ = {J, u1}, a1 = h1
2ξR− 2C, if x′ = y1, a1 = h2
−2L− 2C, if x′ = u1, a1 = h2.
Transition probabilities: As the nodes take action based
only on its current state, the state evolves according to a
Markov chain on X . Let P (x′|x, a1, a2) denote the probabil-
ity that the nodes enter state x′ ∈ X from state x ∈ X after
nodes take action a1 ∈ A and the jammer takes action a2.
We next calculate the transition probabilities for all possible
state-action pairs.
Given (x, a1, a2) = (J, s1, a2) or (J, s2, a2): Recall that the
jammer can detect activity on the channels while jamming,
and hence continues7 to jam the channel till the nodes leave
that channel, i.e., P (J |J, a1, P ) = 1 for all a1 = s1, s2.
Thus, in state J , the nodes should only take action h1 or h2,
otherwise they will get jammed again in the next slot. Also
recall jammer’s strategy that once the nodes are jammed
on a channel, the jammer continues to emit power into the
channel if the nodes continue to stay on the channel. Hence
action s2 is not taken when x = J .
Given (x, a1, a2) = (J, h1, a2): When the nodes take action
h1 in state J they can enter state J or y1 or u1. In state J , the
nodes leave the channel and the jammer restarts the sweep
cycle. The probability they hop onto the same channel in the
next slot is 1/K̃ . We get
P (J |J, h1, P ) = 1/K̃, P (y1|J, h1, P ) = (1− 1/K̃)p
P (u1|J, h1, P ) = (1− 1/K̃)(1− p)
P (J |J, h1, 0) = 0
P (u1|J, h1, 0) = Pr(fading) = 1− p
P (y1|J, h1, 0) = 1− P (u1|J, h1, 0).
(5)
7. That also means that if nodes are in state J , the jammer will never
play the action a2 = 0.
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Given (x, a1, a2) = (J, h2, a2): The new possible states are
y1 or u1. The following are straightforward
P (y1|J, h2, P ) = P (y1|J, h1, P )
P (u1|J, h2, P ) = 1− P (y1|J, h2, P )
P (y1|J, h2, 0) = P (y1|J, h1, 0)
P (u1|J, h2, 0) = 1− P (y1|J, h2, 0).
(6)
Given (x, a1, a2) = (yk, s1, a2), k = 1, 2, · · · K̃ − 2: As the
nodes can verify the cause of transmission failure in the
TD mode, the nodes enter state J only if jamming attack is
successful, otherwise the nodes enter the state yk+1 or uk+1
depending on state of the channel. The nodes are jammed
if the jammer is on the same channel that the nodes are
currently using. The following cases are possible: 1) the
jammer entered the channel in the previous slot, but did
not emit power8. 2) the jammer entered the channel only in
the current slot. Then, ∀k = 1, 2, · · · K̃ − 2 we have
P (J |yk, s1, P ) =
1− q




P (uk+1|yk, s1, P ) = (1− P (J |yk, s1, P ))(1− p)
P (yk+1|yk, s1, P ) =
1− P (J |yk, s1, P )− P (uk+1|yk, s1, P )
P (J |yk, s1, 0) = 0
P (uk+1|yk, s1, 0) = Pr(fading) = 1− p
P (yk+1|yk, s1, 0) = 1− P (uk+1|yk, s1, 0).
(7)
Given (x, a1, a2) = (yk, s2, a2), k = 1, 2, · · · K̃ − 2: The
nodes can transit to uk+1 or yk+1. New state is uk+1 if the
transmission fails due to fading or jamming or both. The
nodes enter into state yk+1 only if channel remains good,
and either 1) jammer did not enter the channel the nodes
are currently using 2) the jammer entered the channel but
did not emit power. We get:






P (uk+1|yk, s2, P ) = 1− P (yk+1|yk, s2, P )
P (uk+1|yk, s2, 0) = P (uk+1|yk, s1, 0)
P (yk+1|yk, s2, 0) = 1− P (uk+1|yk, s2, 0).
(8)
Given (x, a1, a2) = (yk, h1, a2), k = 1, 2, · · · , K̃ − 2: When
the nodes take action h1, they can unambiguously deter-
mine the cause of transmission failure. Also, when it hops,
counting of number of slots spent on the new channel
restarts. Thus, if the nodes take action h1, it enters state J or
y1 or u1. If a2 = P and the nodes hop from a channel, say f ,
to one of the K−1 channels chosen uniformly at random, it
will get jammed if the nodes hop to one of the K − 1−mk
channels not yet swept by the jammer and the jammer also
hops onto that channel in the current time slot9. Then, we
8. In this case the jammer will stay on the channel and attack in the
current slot.
9. If the jammer and nodes are on the same channel in the previous
slot but the jammer did not emit power, then in the current slot the
jammer simply continues the sweep cycle if it finds that nodes have left
the channel.
get:






p(y1|yk, h1, P ) = p (1− P (J |yk, h1, P )) ,
P (u1|yk, h1, P ) = 1− P (J |yk, h1, P )− P (y1|yk, h1, P ).
(9)
Similarly, if a2 = 0, we have
p(y1|yk, h1, 0) = p = 1− P (u1|yk, h1, 0). (10)
Given (x, a1, a2) = (yk, h2, a2), k = 1, 2, · · · , K̃ − 1: The
new states can be u1 or y1. When nodes hop, the probability
of entering state y1 is the same regardless of being in TD or
TR mode (i.e., regardless of the nodes’ action h1 or h2). We
have
P (y1|yk, h2, P ) = P (y1|yk, h1, P ),
P (u1|yk, h2, P ) = 1− P (y1|yk, h2, P ),
P (y1|yk, h2, 0) = p = 1− P (u1|yk, h2, 0).
(11)
Given (x, a1, a2) = (uk, s1, a2), k = 1, 2, · · · K̃ − 2: The new
state can be J or uk+1 or yk+1. Given that the nodes are in
state uk implies that the previous transmission failed which
could be either due to jamming or fading. In the former
case, the new state will be certainly J . In the latter case,
the new state can be J only due to jamming in the current
slot (if a2 = P ). Thus the new state is J either because the
Jammer is on the channel in the previous slot and jammed
previous and the current slot, or because in the previous slot
the channel was in fading and jammer came on the channel
only in the current slot and emitted power. The new state is
yk+1 if the transmission is successful in the current slot. We
have10:
P (J |uk, s1, P ) =
q




P (uk+1|uk, s1, P ) = (1− p) (1− P (J |uk, s1, P ))
P (yk+1|uk, s1, P ) =
1− P (J |uk, s1, P )− P (uk+1|uk, s1, P )
P (yk+1|uk, s1, 0) = p = 1− P (uk+1|uk, s1, 0).
(12)
Recall that when the nodes enters state uk, action s2 is not
applied. Hence we skip computation of P (·|uk, s2).
Given (x, a1, a2) = (uk, h1, a2), k = 1, 2, · · · K̃ − 2: The
nodes can transit to state J or u1 or y1. If the failure happens
in the previous slot due to jamming, the nodes enter state
J after h1 when the new channel is jammed. Since jammer
restarts its sweeping cycle, this probability is 1/K̃ . If the
failure in the previous slot is due to fading, the probability
that the nodes get jammed in the next slot is the same as
10. The transition to state uk depends on action taken previously. For
example, if last action was s1 or h1, the current state uk must be due to
fading in the previous slot. And it is due to either fading or jamming if
the last action was s2 or h2. For simplicity, we ignore this dependency
on the previous action and compute the probabilities assuming that
state uk is entered either due to jamming or fading only.
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Fig. 4: State transition diagram when the nodes
“stay” and the jammer jams
Fig. 5: State transition diagram when the nodes
“stay” and the jammer does not jam
Fig. 6: State transition diagram when the nodes
“hop” and the jammer jams
Fig. 7: State transition diagram when the nodes
“hop” and the jammer does not jam
P (J |yk, h1, P ). Additionally, the nodes move to state y1 if
the new channel is not jammed and not in fading. We have
P (J |uk, h1, P ) =
q
(K̃ − k + 1)K̃
+ (1− p)P (J |yk, h1, P )
P (u1|uk, h1, P ) = (1− p)(1− P (J |uk, h1, P ))
P (y1|uk, h1, P ) = 1− P (J |uk, h1, P )− P (u1|uk, h1, P )
P (y1|uk, h1, 0) = p = 1− P (u1|uk, h1, 0).
(13)
Given (x, a1, a2) = (uk, h2, a2), k = 1, 2, · · · K̃ − 2: The
node can move to state u1 or state y1. It enters state y1 if
the channel is not jammed and not under fading. We have
P (y1|uk, h2, P ) = P (y1|uk, h1, P )
P (u1|uk, h2, P ) = 1− P (y1|uk, h2, P )
P (y1|uk, h2, 0) = P (y1|uk, h1, 0)
P (u1|uk, h2, 0) = 1− P (y1|uk, h2, 0).
(14)
Possible transitions are shown in the Figure 4 and 5.
Lemma 1. The longer the nodes succeed on a channel, the
higher the chance of success on the new channel when it
hops.
Proof: The proof follows by verifying that regardless
of a2, P (y1|yk, h1, a2) is increasing w.r.t. k, i.e.,
P (y1|yk+1, h2, a2) ≥ P (y1|yk, h2, a2)
P (y1|yk+1, h1, a2) ≥ P (y1|yk, h1, a2).
(15)
Intuitively, the longer the nodes stay on a channel and
their current transmission succeeds, the higher the number
of channels that the jammer swept on which the nodes did
not operate (in the current sweeping cycle). Hence, when it
hops, it is likely that the new channel was already swept by
the jammer and will be not attacked in the current sweep
cycle. However, longer the nodes stay on a channel, the
probability they get jammed on the channel increases. This
implies that the nodes should balance the probability of
getting jammed on the current channel and the probability
of not getting jammed when they hop by a proper choice of
channel residence time.
Policy: Policy of each player determines the action they
take in each state. We shall be interested in Markov station-
ary policies where the nodes take an action based on current
state and follows the same policy in each time slot. Follow-
ing the notational convention of [11], let M(A) denote the
distribution on set A and π : X → M(A) denote such a
policy. π(x) def= {π(x, a1), a1 ∈ A}, where π(x, a1) is the
probability of choosing action a1 ∈ A when the nodes are
in state x ∈ X . We denote the collection of such policies as
Π. Similarly, let the jammer’s strategy be g : X →M(PJ),
and let g(x) def= {g(x, a2), a2 ∈ PJ}, where g(x, a2) is the
probability of choosing action a2 ∈ PJ in state x ∈ X .
Since the jammer does not know the state, for any jammer’s
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strategy ω = (ω0, ωP ) ∈ Ω, g(x) = ω,∀x ∈ X .
4.1 Game with Discounted Reward Criterion
From state x, the immediate reward of the transmitter
r(x, a1, a2) where r : X ×A×PJ → R and (pure) actions a1
and a2 are taken by the nodes and the jammer, respectively,
is
r(x, a1, a2) =
∑
x′∈X
U(x, a1, a2, x
′)P (x′|x, a1, a2). (16)
For a given π ∈ Π, and ω ∈ Ω the expected discounted
reward/payoff of the nodes with an initial state x ∈ X is
Ṽ (x, π, ω) = Eπ,ω
[ ∞∑
n=1
δn−1r(Xn, A1n, A2n)|X0 = x
]
,
where {(Xn, A1n, A2n), n = 1, 2, · · · ,∞} is a sequence of
random variables, denoting the state and the actions of
the nodes and the jammer in each time slot. This sequence
evolves according to the initial state and the policy (π, ω).
The operator Eπ,ω denotes the expectation over the policies
(π, ω).
The objective of the FD link is to choose a policy π that
maximizes its expected reward V (x, π, ω) starting from any
initial state x ∈ X , and is defined as
ṼL(x, ω) = max
π∈Π
V (x, π, ω). (17)
On the other hand, the jammer’s objective is to choose a
policy ω that minimizes the nodes’ expected discounted
reward
ṼJ(x, π) = min
ω∈Ω
V (x, π, ω). (18)
Note that the strategy space of jammer is constrained,
whereas it is unconstrained for the nodes. A strategy pair
(π∗, ω∗) is a constrained-Nash equilibrium (NE) if the fol-
lowing holds
• ω∗ ∈ Ω
• for all x ∈ X , π ∈ Π and ω ∈ Ω
Ṽ (x, π, ω∗) ≤ Ṽ (x, π∗, ω∗) ≤ Ṽ (x, π∗, ω).
Note that the Jammer cannot observe the state of the nodes.
Hence its policy is independent of the states11.
Theorem 1. The zero-sum game has a stationary constrained
NE.
Proof: The proof follows by verifying strong Slater
condition in [33][Thm 2.1]. Indeed, for all ω ∈ Ω and π ∈ Π
jammer’s average power constraint can be expressed the
following discounted cost criteria






for any δ = (0, 1), and CJ(Xn, A1n, A2n) = A2n. Where β
denotes the initial distribution of states. Then C(ω, π) ≤
Pavg. Further, for ω̃ such that ω̃0 = 1, C(ω̃, π) < Pavg
11. The jammer knows the state of the nodes only when they are
jammed. But this is of no use as the nodes will leave the channel in
the next slot. The jammer can also infer the state of the nodes in the
round subsequent to jamming (as it can be either y1 or u1). However,
we ignore this information as it does not changes the final analysis.
for all π. Hence the strong slater condition holds and the
constrained NE exists.
The optimal strategy for the jammer is to attack the nodes
as frequently as possible utilizing all of its power. Then,
optimal strategy for the jammer is to emit power into the
selected channel with probability Pavg/P in each time slot.
In the following we compute the optimal strategy of nodes
against this fixed optimal strategy of the jammer.
Optimal defense strategy of nodes: For a fixed jammer’s
strategy ω ∈ Ω, the average reward of the nodes in state x
for playing action a1 is given as
rω(x, a) = ω0r(x, a1, 0) + ω1r(x, a1, P ) (19)
and the probability of state transitioning to state x′ is give
as
Pω(x
′|x, a) = ω0P (x′|x, a1, 0) + ω1P (x′|x, a1, P ). (20)
Since the jammer’s strategy is fixed and does not depend on
the state, the optimal policy for the nodes can be obtained
by solving the resulting MDP with reward and transition
probability computed in (19) and (20) against jammer’s
policy, and in particular against jammer’s optimal policy.
Let f∗ω denote the optimal policy of the jammer against ω.
Since f∗ω can be obtained as optimal policy of an MDP, it
is a deterministic strategy, i.e., f∗ω : X → A. For notational
convenience we drop the dependence of rω, Pω and f∗ω on
ω. We also write V (x) := ṼL(x, ω).
The well-known Bellman equations for the expected dis-
counted utility maximization problem in (17) are as follows
Q(x, a) = r(x, a) + δ
∑
x′∈X
p(x′|x, a){V (x′)} (21)
V (x) = max
a∈A
Q(x, a). (22)
We can then use the value iteration [34][Ch. 6] method to
derive the optimal defence strategy and its properties.
Theorem 2. The optimal policy π∗ satisfies
• There exists a constant K∗ ∈ {1, . . . , K̃ − 1} and
i∗ ∈ {1, 2} such that:
π∗(yk) = hi∗ forK∗ ≤ k ≤ K̃−1 and π∗(J) = hi∗ .
• There exits a constant K∗1 ≤ K∗ such that π(yk) = s2
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K1∗ and π(yk) = s1 for all K1∗ <
k < K∗.
Lemma 2. V (yk) ≥ V (yk+1) for all k ≤ K∗ and V (yk) <
V (yk+1) for k ≥ K∗.
Proof: Using the Bellman relation in (22), we have
V (yk) ≥ Q(yk, a) for all a ∈ A.
From the value iteration algorithm we know that if we
start with any initialization of V0(x), x ∈ X converges to
the values V (x). Without loss of generality assume that
at some iteration i, vi(yk) ≥ V (yk+1) for k ≤ K∗ and
Vi(yk) < Vi(yk+1) for all k ≥ K∗. Then using the last
inequality we can show that the same ordering holds for
(i+ 1)th iteration as well.
Outline of the proof of Theorem 2 is as follows: using
Lemma 2, we show that Q(yk, s1) and Q(yk, s2) are de-
creasing in k, while Q(yk, h1) and Q(yk, h2) are increasing
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in k. The structure of the policy then follows by noting that
optimal action is each state is selected greedily according to
(22). Detailed proof is given in the appendix A.
The above result suggests the following optimal strategy:
If the nodes are successful on a channel for K∗ number of
slots, they should leave the channel. On the new channel,
nodes should operate for the next K∗ slots unless they are
jammed. While they stay on the new channel, the nodes
should operate in the TR for the first K∗1 slots, and then
switch to the TD mode for the next K∗ − K∗1 slots. If they
are jammed while operating in the TD mode they should
hop immediately. We note that, for some set of parameters,
the optimal policy could be such that K∗1 = 1, in which
case the nodes never use the TR mode, and in some cases
K∗1 = K
∗, in which case the nodes never use the TD mode.
In state uk, the nodes use either s1 or hop depending on C
and L.
Corollary 1. The threshold K∗ is increasing in K , and
decreasing in both L and C .
Proof: The proof follows by noting that for any k′ > k,
Q(yk′ , si) − Q(yk, si) is increasing in L and decreasing in
K,∀i ∈ {1, 2}. Moreover, Q(x, hi) is decreasing in C,∀i ∈
{1, 2}, x ∈ X . This verifies that K∗ is decreasing in C .
4.2 Optimal Defense Strategy in Average Reward Crite-
rion
In this section we compute the optimal defense strategy
when the utility of nodes is the average reward. In the
sequel, we follow conventional notations in [11]. Lets de-
fine a |X| × |X| stochastic transition probability matrix
P where its element P (x, x′) is the transition probability
from state x to state x′ when the stationary policy Π is
employed. Let r(t)(x,Π) be the expected reward at time
t when the transmitter starts with an initial state x, and
r(t)(Π)
def
= (r(t)(1,Π), · · · , r(t)(|X|,Π)) be the expected re-
ward vector for all initial states x ∈ A. We have
r(t)(Π) = P tr(Π), (23)
where r(Π) def= (r(1,Π), · · · , r(|X|,Π)) is the vector of
immediate expected reward of the transmitter for all |A|
initial states.
If the underlying Markov chain for a given stationary
policy π ∈ Π is irreducible, the following average reward











From the above transition probabilities, for any station-
ary policy π(x, :) that implements either action h1 or s1 with
non-zero probability, the transmitter can visit state J and
from state J , it can recover to move to any state yk and
uk with non-zero probability. In such cases, the underlying
Markov chain is irreducible and the above average reward
is well-defined. However, the irreducibility of the Markov
chain is not always guaranteed. For example, when chance
of being under fading 1 − p is so small that a transmission
failure likely suggests it is under jamming, it is not necessary
for the transmitter to determine the cause of failure but
to hop onto another channel. In such cases, state J is not
visited. Hence, the selection of using the average reward
criterion should depend on the channel quality.
According to Theorem 2.4.4 and Corollary 2.4.5 in [11],
there exists an optimal NE pure strategy π∗ to maximize the
transmitter’s average reward. The pure strategy is formally
stated as follows.
Let a 4|X| × 1 vector f def= [fx,a] =
([f(1, s1), · · · , f(1, h2)], · · · , [f(|X|, s1), · · · , f(|X|, h2)])








s.t. C1: Wx = 0
C2: 1Tf = 1
C3: fs,a ≥ 0,∀x, a
(25)
where 1 is a all-one 1 × 4|X| vector; W is an 4|X| × |X|
matrix whose element W (x′, (x, a)) = −P (x′|x, a) if x′ 6= x
or W (x′, (x, a)) = 1− P (x′|x, a) if x′ = x.
Then, π∗(x, a) = 1 if f(x, a) > 0, otherwise π∗(x, a) = 0.
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To demonstrate the benefits of using the TR and TD op-
erational modes we compare the performance of our policy,
referred to as “Jointly Optimal” against two strategies which
we refer as “Optimal FH” and “Random FH”. Optimal FH
policy is obtained by optimizing the channel residence time
restricting the mode of operation to TR only. In the Random
FH policy, nodes always hop and use only the TR mode.
The jointly optimal and the optimal FH policy are computed
solving Bellman equations in (21) using value iteration
algorithm, allowing both TR and TD modes for the former
and allowing only TR mode for the later. For all the policies
we compute the average goodput (in Mbps), the success rate
(percentage of un-jammed transmissions), and the average
regret (in Mbps) as in equation (4). The parameters of study
are K , C , L, q and ξ. We set R = 25 Mbps and p = .8,
and m = 2. Unless stated otherwise, we use the following
parameters: K = 8, L = 6 Mbps, C = 8 Mbps, ξ = .7
and q = 1, in the plots. We show the performance for the
policy for the case of discounted rewards. Similar behavior
is expected for the case of average reward.
It is easy to see that if the nodes hop in every slot,
then the probability of them getting jammed in a slot is the
lowest. Hence, if C = 0 and L = 0, the optimal policy
for the nodes is to hop in each slot, i.e., the Random FH
policy, and it results in highest success rate. We thus selected
Random FH for comparison with the success rate of the
optimal policies.
Effect of number of channels (K): Figures (8), (9), and
(10) plot the regret, success rate and throughput of the
three algorithms vs. the number of channel K . As seen, the
Jointly optimal policy has much lower regret and higher
throughput than the Optimal FH (TD mode is not used) or
Random FH. This is due to the effective utilization of TD to
increase the channel residence time (which in turn increases
probability of success on hopping). Since the nodes hop in
every time slot in the Random FH policy, its success rate
is higher than that of the optimal hopping policy (Fig.(9)).
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Fig. 8: Avg. Regret vs. K

























Fig. 9: Success rate vs. K



























Fig. 10: Avg. goodput vs. K



























Fig. 11: Avg. Regret vs. L



















 Jointly Optimal (FH+TR/TD)
Optimal FH (FH+TR)
Random FH (FH+TR)
Fig. 12: Success rate vs. L




























Fig. 13: Avg. goodput vs. L




























Fig. 14: Avg. Regret vs. C























Fig. 15: Success rate vs. C





























Fig. 16: Avg. goodput vs. C
However, hopping too frequently makes the random hop-
ping policy’s regret and throughput worse than that of the
Jointly optimal policy (Figs. (10) and (8)). This is because
the Jointly optimal policy efficiently avoids unnecessary
hops to reduce switching costs. Additionally, as the number
of channel increases, the Jointly optimal policy becomes
more efficient in combating the jammer in all performance
metrics.
Effect of transmission cost (L):Figures (11), (12), and (13)
plot the regret, success rate and throughput of the three
algorithms as L varies. The regret of Optimal policy is
significantly lower (more than 43%) than the other poli-
cies, especially when the transmission cost is higher. This
is because with higher transmission cost, the loss due to
failure/jamming is also higher, that makes the optimal de-
cisions in hopping or switching TD/TR mode of the jointly
optimal policy more pronounced. As we can see in Fig. (12),
the success rate of the policies remain the same as we varyL.
Notice that the plot is for a fixed K and the nodes have the
same amount of room (channels) to escape form the jammer
for any value of L. Jointly optimal policy is almost the same
as that when the nodes hop after every time slot while still
attaining higher throughput as seen in (13). As we increase
L on the x-axis it contributes linearly to the regret as every
12





















 Jointly Optimal (FH+TR/TD)
Optimal FH (FH+TR)
Random FH (FH+TR)
Fig. 17: Avg. regret vs. ξ


















 Jointly Optimal (FH+TR/TD)
Optimal FH (FH+TR)
Random FH (FH+TR)
Fig. 18: Success rate vs. ξ




























Fig. 19: Avg. goodput vs. ξ



























Fig. 20: Avg. Regret vs Jammer strategy (q)
time jamming occurs more amount of loss is incurred with
increase in L. Also, the jointly optimal policy has incurs
lesser number of jammed slots as Optimal FH snd hence
achieves a better regret performance for larger values of L.
Effect of hopping cost (C): In Figures (14), (15), and (16)
we compare regret, success rate and throughput of Jointly
optimal policy against Random FH and Optimal FH as C
varies. The effect of C is similar to that of L in Figures
(10)-(11), and the jointly optimal policy is the most robust
algorithm to jamming (with more than 20% lower regret, on
average, than others’).
Effect of imperfect SIS ξ: In Figures (17), (18), and (19)
we depict regret, success rate and throughput vs. the effect
of imperfect SIS (ξ) of the Jointly optimal policy against
Random FH and Optimal FH. As can be seen, the less
perfect SIS (i.e., lower ξ), the more effective in combating
jamming of the Jointly optimal policy. On average, the
Jointly optimal policy yields less than 45% regret than the
Random FH policy. Similar to the above, the success rate of
the Jointly optimal policy is almost the same as that when
nodes hop in every time slot.
Effect of Jammer’s strategy q: Figure (20) show the effect of
jammer’s strategy on the regret. As expected, the regret is
monotonically increasing in q. Notice that when the value of
q is low, the use of both TD and TR mode helps in improving
the throughput. The benefit of using both TR and TD mode
diminishes as q is increased comparing to the case when
only TR mode is used.
6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we identified the severe susceptibility to
jamming attack of wireless nodes that are equipped with
in-band full-duplex radios (IBFD). To combat jammers, we
then defined two operational modes for the IBFD radios:
Transmission Reception (TR) and Transmission Detection or
half-duplex (TD). Together with the low Packet Detection
Rate, jamming can be effectively detected by allowing IBFD
radios to switch to the TD mode. We developed an optimal
strategy against an “IBFD reactive sweep jammer”. The
nodes’ optimal defense strategy that guides them when to
hop and which operational mode to use is established from
the equilibrium of the stochastic Markov game. We prove
that this optimal policy has a threshold-structure, in which
the IBFD nodes stay on the same channel up to a certain
number of time slots before hopping.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 2: The nodes can take all possible actions
in states yk ∈ Y . The cost-to-go value of station-action pairs
(yk, a) for all, k = 1, 2, · · · , K̃ − 2 and a ∈ A are as follows
(after simplification)








+ δ(V (J) + V (uk+1) + V (yk+1))





+ δ(V (uk+1) + V (yk+1))












(R− C + L)− L
+ δ(V (J) + V (uk+1 + V (yk+1)))












(2ξR− 2C + 2L)− 2L
+ δ(V (u1) + V (y1))
When the nodes are in state J , the Q-values can be calcu-
lated as follows





(R− C + L)
+ δ(V (J) + V (u1) + V (y1))





(2Rξ − 2C + 2L)
+ δ(V (u1) + V (y1)).
First consider the case Q(J, h2) > Q(J, h1). Then, the
nodes hop in TR mode whenever they are jammed and
V (J) = Q(J, h2). Substituting this value in Q(y1, s1) and
Q(y1, s2), we get Q(y1, s2) ≥ Q(y1, s1). Further, note that
Q(yk, s1) and Q(yk, s2) are decreasing in k. This implies
that the longer the nodes stay on the same channel, their
vulnerability to jamming increases and the average reward
decreases. Next, note that both Q(yk, h1) and Q(yk, h2)
are also decreasing in k. However, the rate at which they
decrease is smaller than that of decrease of Q(yk, s1) and
Q(yk, s2). This implies that there exists 1 < K∗ < K̃ − 1
such that Q(yk, h2) ≤ Q(yk, s2) and Q(yk, h2) ≤ Q(yk, s1)
for k ≤ K∗ and Q(yk, h2) ≥ Q(yk, s2) and Q(yk, h2) ≥
Q(yk, s1) for k > K∗. Hence, the nodes stay on the same
channel for K∗ slots before they hop.
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Consider the difference Q(yk, s2) − Q(yk, s1). This dif-
ference is decreasing in k. This implies that there exists a
K∗1 such that for k ≤ K̃∗1 , Q(yk, s2) ≥ Q(yk, s1) and for
k > K̃∗1 ,Q(yk, s2) ≤ Q(yk, s1). Hence, the nodes take action
s2 in state for yk if k ≤ K̃∗1 otherwise they take action s1. If
K̃∗1 < K
∗, we set K∗1 = K̃
∗




For the case Q(J, h2) ≤ Q(J, h1), it is easy to note the
nodes never enter the TR mode. Then K̃∗1 = K
∗, i.e., nodes
take action s1 in the first K∗ if they remain unjammed and
then hop.
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